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Following up on Interests: The Private 
Agreement Exemption in Ontario Securities Law 
Mary G. Condon, Osgoode Hall Law School 
This paper uses insights from cultural theories of regulation and critical legal 
studies to argue that regulatory outcomes are not adequately explained by the 
activities of dominant interest groups. A more dynamic conception of the 
relationship between interests and ideas, especially legal ones, is required. Discur- 
sive shifts among languages of entrepreneurship, ownership, fairness, and market 
credibility are shown to be consequential for the outcome of the reform debate 
examined, not least because of the importance of these ideas, variously interpreted, 
in shaping the positions of interest groups. 
INTRODUCTION 
A defining feature in much academic analysis of regulatory reform 
and decision-making is the centrality accorded to the role of interest 
groups in explaining specific regulatory outcomes (Mitnick, 1980). Thus, 
public choice economists and pluralist or Marxist political scientists join 
issue on whether the substantive policies of agencies or the terms of 
legislative reform reflect the 'capture' of the regulatory process by domi- 
nant constituencies of an agency or are rather the embodiment of particu- 
lar interpretations of the 'public interest' (Stigler, 1988; Bernstein, 1955; 
Kolko, 1963; Moran, 1986; Phillips and Zecher, 1981; Reschenthaler, 1976). 
In these rather instrumentalist accounts, the power of an interest group is 
often defined in terms of access to material or knowledge resources, or as 
resulting from a privileged location in the regulatory decision-making 
process. Against this power is pitted the regulatory responsibility to make 
policy in the 'public interest.' From this perspective, identifying an interest 
position (i.e., that result which is desired by an interest group) can become 
a somewhat tautological process, in the sense that the outcome of a 
particular policy debate is assumed to be the result that was sought by a 
specific powerful group. 
This approach to the regulatory process as a sort of equation - -  
'dominant  interest group,' added to regulatory agency or legislature, 
equals the desired resu l t - -  provides a rather impoverished and determin- 
ist account of how it is that interests may produce outcomes. In this 
account, the formulation and presentation of interest positions in policy 
debates assumes only secondary importance (Derthick and Quirk, 1985). 
This view of interests as autonomous actors belies evidence that these 
positions are often built from fragile, contingent coalitions (Thompson, 
1982). More importantly, it ignores the fact that interests must operate in 
the context of particular sets of arguments and ideas. In response to these 
problems, some commentators have advocated a cultural approach to 
understanding the regulatory process. Thus, Meidinger proposes: 
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a cultural perspective [that] focuses on the understandings that are nego- 
tiated and enacted by actors in regulatory arenas. It tends to presume that 
those understandings are important in their own right, and are not simply 
reducible to other factors such as pregiven material interests or power. 
(1987: 366) 
Such an 'intermediate analytical position' would, he contends, offer a 
middle ground between the rigidity of structural models, which assume 
that actors have no autonomy, and the looseness of individualist ap- 
proaches to social phenomena. Meidinger's reference to 'shared ideas' 
should not obscure the fact that views about the regulatory ideas appropri- 
ate to a particular context may not be shared, but are often the subject of 
struggle (Salter, 1982; Hutchinson, 1988; Derthick and Q u i rk  1985). 
However  the general point that sets of ideas and languages structure the 
regulatory enterprise and its objectives, the range of possible outcomes of 
decision-making, and the way in which regulatory problems are defined, 
is one worth exploring for the understanding it may add to the relationship 
between interests and outcomes in the regulatory arena. In order to apply 
this argument about the importance of ideas to the regulatory context, 
however,  some attention to the relevant sources of the ideas is required. It 
is here that social-science investigations of the regulatory process cross 
paths with the concerns of critical legal scholarship. 
Obviously, for regulators, a primary source of the ideas animating 
their activity is the statute(s) which purports to define not only the 
parameters of their authority to act, but the general objectives they should 
pursue and the legal strategies to achieve these objectives. Social scientists 
who analyse the regulatory process often pay insufficiently close attention 
to the legal ideas and provisions framing the activities of regulators and 
their constituents. On the other hand, mainstream legal theorists do not 
concern themselves, by and large, with the social world in which legal 
ideas are interpreted. However, critical legal scholarship has been very 
interested in the power and deployment of legal ideas and language, 
though to date this interest has been largely focused on the adjudicative 
process in the higher courts. The concern of the present paper is to apply 
the insights of critical legal theory to an example of regulatory reform in 
securities markets, in order to understand more dearly the relationship 
between interests and legal discourse in this arena (Gor.don, 1987; Ireland, 
1987). 
It would be impossible to do justice to the richness of this body of 
scholarship in the present short discussion (Kelman, 1987; Gordon, 1982, 
1984, 1987; Boyle, 1985; Fitzpatrick and Hunt, 1987; Hutchinson, 1991; 
Trubek, 1986). However  certain core propositions can be briefly stated. 
The first thing to note is that, although these scholars would eschew a rigid 
distinction between 'law' and 'society,' work in this area has dimensions 
both internal and external to law (Kelman, 1987: 253). Internally, these 
scholars have shown in repeated locations of legal decision-making that it 
is not possible to apply legal rules in a way that produces one 'right' 
answer, as mainstream legal scholarship purports to demonstrate through 
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highly technical forms of argumentation and distinctions between cases. 
Rather the logic of any legal principle would support a variety of contra- 
dictory outcomes (Kelman, 1987: 258). In other words, law is underdeter- 
mined and outcomes are contingent on a variety of interpretive factors, 
including construction of fact situations and manipulation of open-tex- 
tured legal concepts. Another aspect of the agenda of critical legal studies 
is to investigate how particular kinds of legal and other languages interact 
with each other. This is an issue missing from most analyses of the 
regulatory process, and is particularly fruitful for scholars of economic 
regulation. 
Externally, these supposed certainties of legal rules operate to attach 
an 'idealised fantasy' of order to social life (Gordon, 1987: 198), while 
maintaining the fiction of the autonomy of legal decision-making from 
society at large. This external ordering is achieved both through the 
patterning and privileging of particular outcomes and through the consti- 
tution of individual consciousness in terms of legal categories. Thus, law 
and society, or law and economy, are not separable entities, but are 
interpenetrative and interdependent (Fitzpatrick, 1982; Kelman, 1987: 
253). 
Because of the preoccupation of critical legal scholarship with case by 
case adjudication, the phenomenon of the existence of interest groups - -  
who are often organisations (Hancher and Moran, 1989) and who have 
ongoing relationships with decision-makers--and the problems involved 
in specifying interests over periods of time, are rarely addressed (Gordon, 
1984: 106). It is assumed that powerful interests are privileged in legal 
outcomes, with the argument being that 'the judicial emperor, clothed and 
coiffured in appropriately legitimate and voguish garb by the scholarly 
rag trade, chooses and acts to protect and preserve the propertied interest 
of vested white, male and monied power' (Hutchinson, 1991: 184; Gordon, 
1987: 199). One obvious question, though, is what happens in regulatory 
debates within the domain of 'vested white, male and monied power?' 
More generally, it is arguable that this stance does not sufficiently specify 
the complexity of the relationship between interests and outcomes and, in 
particular, the various ways in which interest positions are themselves 
formulated through legal ideas and categories. Sometimes interest groups 
are constrained, in the positions they adopt, by the discourses through 
which they operate and sometimes this constraint defeats them. It is also 
necessary to recognise that the complexity of the relationship between 
interests and outcomes is exacerbated by that very indeterminacy of legal 
discourse to which critical legal scholars point. 
INTRODUCING THE PRIVATE AGREEMENT EXEMPTION: 
CONTEXT AND CHRONOLOGY 
It is proposed to illuminate the relationship between interests and 
legal discourse by using an' example drawn from debate in the 1970s about 
certain aspects of the regulation of takeovers under the Ontario Securities 
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Act. The reform of the so-called 'private agreement exemption'  has 
generated considerable academic legal commentary,  but most  of this 
commentary  has failed to address the implications of this reform debate 
for understanding both the activities of interest groups and the role of 
language in the regulatory process (Courtright, 1985; Bailey and Crawford,  
1983; Rosenfeld, 1972). An overview of the legal context of, and partici- 
pants in, the debate will be provided at this point, along with a brief 
chronological guide to the various official reports and legislative bills 
which considered the matter. Discussion of every stage of the road to 
reform is required, since part  of our concern is to chart the alterations in 
interest positions and the varieties of legal ideas deployed as debate 
progressed. 
Securities law is a peculiarly North American phenomenon,  which 
originated in a few US states in the first decade of the twentieth century and 
gathered momen tum federally after the Depression. Disclosure of infor- 
mation by companies selling shares to the public, as a way of protecting 
investors from fraud, along with the establishment of a regulatory agency, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), to enforce this, were core 
elements of Roosevelt 's New Deal (Seligman, 1982). Ontario's securities 
legislation, administered by an agency known as the Ontario Securities 
Commission (OSC), has followed a similar pattern. Thus, certain disclo- 
sure and other requirements, to be fulfilled by public corporations have 
been established, 1 with the concomitant possibility of exemption from 
those requirements. The conditions under which exemptions may  be 
availed of are specified in the legislation, with a residual category at the 
discretion of the Securities Commission. This pattern was exhibited in the 
segment  of the 1966 Ontario statute (Ontario Securities Act Stat. Ont. 1966, 
c.142) putting in place for the first time a scheme for the regulation of 
takeovers. 
A takeover is obviously a significant event in corporate life, with major 
consequences for shareholders, management  and employees. Under  the 
1966 provisions, a person or company proposing a takeover (the offeror) 
was required to make certain disclosures about the nature of the offer - -  
in a document  known as a takeover bid circular - -  to shareholders of the 
target company (the offeree), in order to assist them in deciding whether  
to tender their shares to the bid. Here the principle was established that the 
pr imary concern of the regulatory provisions was for protection of the 
target shareholders, rather than shareholders of the offeror (Gillens, 1986). 
The statute provided for exemption from the disclosure requirements in a 
variety of circumstances. That which concerns us here is the exemption in 
the case of an agreement  for the sale of shares between the offeror and a 
group of controlling shareholders of the offeree company. We shall see 
shortly what  the arguments  underlying the availability of this exemption 
w e r e .  
Following passage of the 1966 Act containing this exemption from the 
takeover bid rules, the issue was re-examined in 1969 in an OSC report, 
known as the Merger Study, commissioned by the Minister for Financial 
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and Commercial Affairs (Courtright, 1985:66). 2 This report gave the Or 
a unique opportunity to set the tone for debate on this issue. After 
distribution of the Merger Study, which recommended that the situation 
of the private agreement exemption remain unchanged, Bill 154 was 
introduced to the legislative assembly in June 1972. However  in 1973, a 
committee of the legislature, the Select Committee on Company Law, 
again considered the question of the private agreement exemption. In 
accordance with the majority opinion on the Select Committee, Bill 75 in 
1974 retained the exemption unchanged. Then Bill 98, presented in 1975, 
removed it entirely. This situation persisted through Bills 20 and 30 in 
1977, but Bill 7 - -  which ultimately became the 1978 Securities Act (Stat. 
Ont. 1978, c.47.) - -  recovered the exemption, although adding a require- 
ment for a 'follow-up offer' to the remaining (non-controlling) sharehold- 
ers in certain situations. 
Before turning to consider in more detail the terrain of argument 
around which the issue was considered in the 1970s, let us quickly 
enumerate the major participants. There is no doubt that the Securities 
Commission itself had a pivotal role in the whole legislative reform 
process. It was author of one of the earliest reports to consider the matter 
and of subsequent drafts of the statute, and also appeared before the 
various legislative committees that dealt with the issue. As the debate 
unfolded, other key participants included groups of issuers (corporations 
which issue shares to the public) and major shareholders, as well as self- 
regulatory organisations in the field, particularly the Toronto Stock Ex- 
change (TSE) and the Investment Dealers Association (IDA). The role and 
jurisdiction of these two organisations with respect to the government 
regulator, the OSC, is worthy of more extensive treatment than can be 
accorded the topic here (Stenning, 1990). Briefly, both organisations 
regulate the activities of their members - -  brokerage and investment 
h o u s e s - -  under  the supervision of the OSC. The TSE has responsibility for 
operating a stock exchange, again with oversight from the OSC. Both also 
represent the interests of their members at the regulatory and political 
levels. 
To anticipate a process described more fully in later sections, it might 
be helpful to note here that the progress of this reform debate was 
characterised by the emergence of divergent sets of ideas to express the 
problem and frame its solution. These ideas, whose meaning altered and 
whose influence waxed and waned throughout the decade, included those 
of entrepreneurship, ownership, fairness and market credibility. 
THE MERGER STUDY: IN PRAISE OF ENTREPRENEURS 
Despite the title by which it is informally known, the major preoccu- 
pation of the OSC's Merger Stfldy was the practice of private placement. 
Under  s.58(1) of the 1966 Securities Act, a corporation could circumvent the 
statutory disclosure requirements occasioned by the initial public offering 
of shares, by selling the shares to a designated 'exempt purchaser' or by 
selling a block of shares for an amount  exceeding $97,000. The rationale for 
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these exemptions was that 'sophisticated' investors did not need the 
protection of the mandated disclosure requirements. The increasing 
frequency of this practice, said to be prompted by growth in the number  
of f inandal institutions (such as mutual funds and investment companies), 
managing ever-larger pools of personal savings on behalf of 'small '  
individual or retail investors, was considered problematic by  regulators 
for two reasons. One was that the practice denied individual investors the 
opportuni ty  to participate independently in initial share offerings. Sec- 
ond, it paved the way for 'backdoor underwritings'  whereby private 
placees (those to whom shares were sold in a private placement) could 
resell the shares to the public without the need for prospectus disclosure. 
As it was admitted that the demands  of both issuing corporations and 
financial institutions for the opportunity to undertake these large, cheap 
and trouble-free transactions had to be accommodated,  the Merger Report 
devoted itself to reconciling this situation with the desirability of contin- 
ued market  participation by small investors under  'protected'  conditions. 
Thus, the issue with which we are primarily concerned, exemptions 
for private agreement takeovers, has to be seen both in the context of the 
drive to accommodate disclosure exemptions generally as well as, more 
fundamentally,  the analytic distinction established by the Merger Report 
between the 'needs'  of small investors and those of large ones. This 
bifurcation was continued into discussion of the private agreement  ex- 
emption and, as we shall see, permeated all subsequent consideration of 
it at the political and regulatory level. 
When the Merger Report turned to consider the private agreement  
takeover, where the offeror makes a deal with a small group of controlling 
shareholders only, its expressed desire was to 'alleviate the situation in 
which the minority shareholder now finds himself.' This was defined as 
one where in 'a competition for control between relative giants,' minori ty 
shareholders were at a loss, 'because of competing claims or the atmos- 
phere of uncertainty, to know the best course to follow.' Here the OSC 
appeared to recognise the issue as one of a power  differential among 
different groups of shareholders, but as we shall see, it concluded that this 
differential was not conclusive. The committee was obviously unsure 
what  to recommend but was 'loathe' to suggest the 'easiest and least 
flexible solution' which would be to prohibit all exempt offers. While 
producing equality this would 'reduce incentive to a common denomina-  
tor, including the incentive to control, manage, build and then divest  to 
take the benefit of those efforts.' 
Despite the much-vaunted advantages of disclosure, no recommen-  
dations were made to increase disclosure to minority shareholders in this 
situation. Nor  did the OSC's committee follow up on the opportuni ty  to 
redress the power  imbalances here by recommending the creation of any 
legal obligation on the part of majority shareholders towards the minority. 
Rather, it expressed the view that the concept of 'oppression of the 
minority should be left to corporate law to elaborate.' 
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Having summarily dismissed the disclosure disadvantages under  
which minority shareholders laboured, the OSC report turned its attention 
to the other disadvantageous aspect of a private agreement takeover, from 
the minority shareholders' point of view. This was that 'the acquisition of 
effective control by private agreement [with controlling shareholders] 
almost invariably involves the payment of a premium to the selling 
shareholders and in many cases no general offer is made to other share- 
holders to acquire their shares on the same or substantially similar terms' 
(Ontario Legislative Assembly, Hodgson Report, 1973: 28). Thus the 
problem was not just one of lack of disclosure but an advantage extracted 
by a controlling shareholder, and made possible by the legal rules, in 
return for saving the offeror the costs and effort of meeting disclosure 
requirements. 
In addressing this inequality of opportunity as between large and 
small shareholders, the Merger Report turned for inspiration to the situ- 
ation prevailing under the United Kingdom City Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers, whereby controlling directors or shareholders could not sell 
without obtaining an undertaking that the buyer would make a compa- 
rable offer to the remaining shareholders. Although the authors of the 
Merger Report agreed that this requirement had a 'most appealing appear- 
ance of fairness,' it was ultimately rejected because it moved "further down 
the road towards removing all incentive for entrepreneurship. '  It was 
therefore recommended that the private agreement exemption be retained 
in the legislation though the number of shareholders with whom agree- 
ments could be made should be reduced to fifteen. 
Given the construction of the takeover problem by the Merger Study 
in terms of the competing interests of controlling and minority sharehold- 
ers, the authors of the study were faced with the choice between reinforc- 
ing controlling shareholders' interest in being rewarded for risk or that of 
minority shareholders in being placed on an equal footing with other 
shareholders in the corporate enterprise. In undertaking a r isk/return 
calculation on behalf of controlling shareholders, and ultimately privileg- 
ing the value of incentives over equality, the OSC sidestepped the conse- 
quences of its recognition that the ability of large shareholders to capitalise 
on their control depended on the disempowerment of small shareholders. 
The legitimacy of this choice was accomplished by defining the controlling 
shareholder as an entrepreneur, in the absence of empirical information 
that this was in fact the case, and despite evidence of growing sharehold- 
ings by (non-entrepreneurial) financial institutions, managing small-in- 
vestor capital. In other words, the power of the language of entrepre- 
neurship framed the solutions that could be found to the problems 
identified by the Merger Study. Finally, while the assumption was made 
that entrepreneurial activity was good for the economy, no consideration 
was addressed to the prior question of whether takeovers themselves were 
similarly beneficial. In an economy characterised by a high concentration 
of corporate ownership, the argument could be made that increased 
numbers of takeovers among small groups of shareholders could damage 
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economic vibrancy and diversity. This issue was not, however, explored. 
It has been noted already that a takeover is a significant event for a variety 
of corporate constituencies. The approach taken by the Merger Study 
ensured that shareholders were the only relevant constituency for pur- 
poses of debate about the consequences of reform. 
In the event, Bill 154 of 1972, drafted by the OSC, reflected the 
recommendations contained in the Merger Study concerning the private 
agreement exemption. Although the Bill as a whole generated consider- 
able hostility from interest groups like the IDA and the Canadian Manu- 
facturers Association (CMA), very little attention was paid to the private 
agreement exemption. Evidently the disadvantages of the exemption to 
small investors, as enumerated by the OSC, were not compelling enough 
to provoke a reaction from that quarter. Indeed, representations by small 
investors were notable by their absence throughout this period. 
REVISITING INTERESTS OR WHO OWNS, WINS 
The withdrawal of Bill 154 ended the first phase of 'official' delibera- 
tion about the private agreement exemption. The issue was raised publicly 
again in 1973 by the Legislative Assembly's Select Committee on Com- 
pany Law. This Committee was reconstituted to, among other things, 
'enquire into and review the law relating to mergers or amalgamations.' 
The key premise of this Committee was that the takeover bid was an 
important 'vehicle for effecting a business combination' and it evidently 
regarded the Merger Study treatment of this issue as incomplete. In 
deciding how to think about takeover bids generally, the Select Committee 
likewise resorted to English experience with the City Code (Hodgson 
Report, 1973: 26-27). The Committee explicitly identified an idea under- 
lying some of the City Code's 'general principles of conduct' as relevant to 
the Ontario situation. This was a concept of 'equity between one share- 
holder and another' (Hodgson Report, I973: 27). This concept is resonant 
of the position rejected in the Merger Study four years previously. 
When the Committee turned its attention specifically to the private 
agreement exemption, it first noted that this form of takeover was a 
'common occurrence' in Ontario (Hodgson Report, 1973: 28). The 'di- 
lemma' of minority shareholders was described as one 'where control of 
the corporation in which they have invested has changed leaving them 
with two options - -  to remain as shareholders and accept the changed 
situation or to sell their shares on the market at a price which will 
undoubtedly be less than the price received by controlling shareholders, '  
The policy options identified by the Committee in response to this problem 
were to (1) allow the situation to continue (2) remove the exemption from 
the legislation, or (3) continue the exemption but make it conditional on a 
general offer to all the other shareholders of the same class. 
In setting about deciding which option should prevail, the report 
framed the problem as 'the difficult task of protecting interests.' In 
adopting a liberal conception of two formally equal interests to be 'bal- 
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anced / the  Committee accepted existing definitions of the interests. Yet, 
as we shall see, it became apparent that the 'serious division of opinion' 
existing within the Committee as to which of the proposed options was 
preferable could have potentially profound implications for the very 
existence of those interests. It should be noted that the division broke 
down on party political lines, with the Progressive Conservative members 
on the Committee' in the majority and the Liberal and NDP members 
together in the minority. In the end, the majority favoured the status quo, 
with the minority advocating that the 'present exemption in the Securities 
Act should be made conditional on the person acquiring such control 
making within a reasonable period ... an offer to the remaining sharehold- 
ers of the same class .... ' However, what interests us here are the argu- 
ments mobilised by the opposing sides in favour of their option. Debate 
came to centre on the very meaning of share ownership. 
The majority argument went as follows: 'shares of a corporation are a 
form of personal property and ... the owner should be entitled to dispose 
of them by private agreement on whatever terms he may consider advis- 
able without interference on the part of the legislature....' On the other 
hand, the minority took the view that, because each share in the capital of 
a company was the same as every other share of the same class, 'when a 
controlling shareholder sells control, the thing he is really selling is 
corporate assets and the right to control the use of those assets and those 
assets belong to all of the shareholders, not merely the controller.' Thus, 
according to the minority on the Committee, there were 'valid arguments 
to be made on a conceptual basis that any premium on the sale of control 
should be shared by all shareholders.' 
Now these differing views about the legal status of shareowners and 
the consequences of holding control were by no means unique to members 
of this Legislative Committee. In fact, this particular debate over the 
nature of corporate shares has a respectably long intellectual history, with 
the positions of Committee members drawn from two opposing strands of 
this history (Bailey and Crawford, 1983). As early as 1932, Berle and Means 
had formulated the 'corporate asset theory' of corporate control whereby 
the power provided by control was an asset belonging only to the corpo- 
ration, as opposed to the shareholders. Thus: 
The position of a majority shareholder, with his capacity to control, is... not 
a 'property right' in the same sense as is his right to participate in 
dividends, or in liquidation or the like. His control power is really 
adventitious, a by-product of the corporate capacity to choose a board of 
directors by less than unanimity. This is why the control power--capacity 
to choose a management - -  is a corporate asset, not an individual one. 
(Berle, 1965:638) 
Berle asserted that the holder of control was 'not so much the owner of a 
proprietary right as the occupier of a power position.' Conceiving of 
control as a corporate asset might require attention to the position of 
minority shareholders in a takeover transaction. In contrast, other com- 
mentators have made the 'property right' argument and have also pointed 
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to the loss of efficiency involved in establishing barriers to corporate 
control transactions, because 'reducing the controlling shareholder's in- 
centive to sell his control retards the reallocation of the assets of the 
corporation to people who can use them more productively to the benefit 
of all of the shareholders' (Posner, 1977:304; Javaras, 1965; Comment, 
1964). 
Apart  from illustrating the dependence of reform proposals on pre- 
existing intellectual ground, this disagreement over the parameters of 
controlling-share ownership opens the way to important insights into the 
role of legal discourse in shaping the interests of corporate constituencies, 
as well as the dependence of corporate organisation and activities on legal 
constructs. The choice of a particular set of legal ideas (that is, shares as 
personal or as corporate property) becomes significant in identifying what 
it means to be a controlling or a minority shareholder. The features of 
controlling-share ownership, and, presumably, their very existence as an 
interest group distinct from minority shareholders, turns out to be shifting 
and contentious ground based on a set of contingent and reworkable legal 
concepts. Similarly, the arguments for and against the corporate asset 
theory of control demonstrate the difficulty of identifying conclusively the 
interests of minority shareholders. Does their interest lie primarily in the 
efficient reallocation of corporate assets in order to maximise corporate 
wealth, or is it in the sharing of powers normally associated with control? 
Furthermore, the fluidity of the characteristics of controlling or minor- 
ity shareholding has consequences for the identification of corporate 
assets, as well as corporate ability to raise capital and make decisions 
generally. The possibility of continuous reconstruction of the dimensions 
of ownership, the internal relations and responsibilities of corporate 
shareholders, and the relationship between the corporation and its share- 
holders by manipulation of legal concepts all serve to illustrate the 
malleability of the corporate form itself (White, 1985:34). 
Two related points were raised by the majority on the Committee to 
buttress its position in favour of the status quo. One of these, that to abolish 
the private agreement would 'reduce the incentive for a person to develop 
and manage a business" by denying her a 'well merited premium,'  
maintained continuity with the predominant arguments of the OSC's 
Merger Study. This was a matter of some irony in view of the fact that the 
OSC's representatives to the Select Committee 3 indicated that 'their think- 
ing' about exempt offers had changed in the intervening period. They 
'now favoured the requirement of a general offer to the remaining share- 
holders.' The OSC's reasons for its shift of position are not evident from 
the Select Committee's report. However,  a prominent legal commentator 
on Ontario's securities regulation suggests that the Commission was 
becoming concerned about the frequency with which controlling interests 
were changing hands at a premium (Alboini, 1980: 684). It appears that the 
Commission 'indicated in several informal announcements that, as a 
matter of fairness or ethics, such a purchaser should make an offer of 
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equivalent value to the minority shareholders.' It will be recalled that this 
language of fairness, and the position against control premiums that it 
implied, had been explicitly rejected in the Merger Study in favour of the 
then more compelling and economically-oriented discourse of entrepre- 
neurship and risktaking. In any event, the OSC's change of heart was not 
enough to convince the majority of the Select Committee to depart from its 
belief in the controlling shareholder's entitlement to dispose of her shares 
as she chose. The minority on the Committee was content with responding 
that the argument about entrepreneurship 'may not be as strong as it 
appears. '  
The Merger Study's consideration of a fairness dimension to the 
problem of the private agreement exemption had been inspired by the 
English City Code's framing of the relationship between shareholders in 
this way. Despite the Select Committee's earlier invocation of the City 
Code's 'general principles' of equity as relevant to Ontario, the majority 
now disputed their applicability to the private agreement exemption 
because they did not 'represent a legal enactment but are of persuasive 
force only.' Furthermore, such principles had been 'developed for appli- 
cation to a financial system whose resources, philosophy and operations 
are different from our own.' This position is reminiscent of the Merger 
Study's focus on Canadian entrepreneurs and illustrates the tenacity of 
this discourse. 
NEW PROPOSALS FOR OLD: 1974-1977 
In accordance with the thrust of the majority position, the new Bill 75, 
introduced in the legislature in June 1974, did not disturb the situation 
prevailing in Bill 154 whereby an offer to purchase from less than fifteen 
shareholders was exempt from the takeover bid requirements (Dey, 
1975:36). Although few of the interest groups which responded to the 
introduction of Bill 75 dwelt on the question of takeovers and exempt 
offers, the brief of one influential group, the TSE, did include reference to 
takeovers. This suggested that 'further examination' of the takeover 
situation should be undertaken by itself and the OSC. In discussing the 
shortcomings of the existing regulatory scheme, the TSE's brief concluded 
that 'the Exchange is of the view that the basic principles attaching to 
takeover bids should include concepts of full disclosure and equality of 
price and access among all shareholders.' In other words, the TSE 
favoured the language of equality over that of entrepreneurship. 
The momentum established by the strong dissent in the Select 
Committee's report, the about-turn of the OSC and the support  of its 
position by the TSE bore remarkable fruit in Bill 98, given first reading in 
the legislature on May 30, 1975. As the OSC's reaction to Bill 75 and its 
aftermath, it represented a considerable shift from the earlier provisions 
on exempt takeover offers. The exemption for a takeover by private 
agreement with less than fifteen shareholders was entirely removed from 
the Bill. This option, of course, accorded with neither the majority nor the 
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minority position on the Select Committee nor the (revised) OSC position 
of that time. The effect of the removal would be to require a circular to be 
issued in all takeover situations except those exempted by other provisions 
of the legislation (Dey, 1975:37). Removing the bargaining advantage for 
controlling shareholders was presumably intended to discourage any 
disparity of opportunity as between controlling and minority sharehold- 
ers. The reasons for OSC adoption of this option are unclear although there 
is some suggestion that the Commission was aware that this more drastic 
option would not survive legislative debate (Bray, 1975:252). 
Bill 98 was soon abandoned because an election intervened, but its 
subsequent manifestations, as Bill 20 (April 1977) and Bill 30 (June 1977), 
likewise eliminated the private agreement exemption provided for in the 
1966 Act. But by now the elimination of the exemption had become an 
unattractive proposition at the political level. Before Bill 30 could proceed 
to second reading, it was withdrawn by the Minister of Consumer and 
Commercial Relations in November 1977. The Minister announced that 
three aspects of the Bill would be reconsidered 'in light of current condi- 
tions' by the newly appointed Chair of the Securities Commission, James 
Baillie (Ontario Securities Commission Bulletin, December, 1977: 270). One 
of these aspects was the possible restoration of "some modified version' of 
the private agreement exemption. The 'current conditions' appeared to 
include efforts to enhance rates of capital formation in Canada generally, 
in a climate of increasingly competitive international trading. An element 
of this preoccupation was a 'new look' being taken, at the federal level, 'at 
permitting mergers which increase efficiency and productivity without 
becoming monopolies. '4 
Now while the OSC was conducting its review of exemptions from the 
takeover bid rules, it was required to adjudicate on a matter related to the 
regulation of issuer bids. This is a situation where an issuer seeks to 
purchase or redeem its own securities from shareholders as a form of 
takeover, thus eliminating public participation in the corporation. Al- 
though this kind of takeover differs from the private agreement, it has the 
similar feature of a potentially coercive relationship between powerful, 
controlling shareholders and those in the minority. It is therefore impor- 
tant to note the Commission's position in Cablecasting (Ontario Securities 
Commission Bulletin, Feb. 1978: 37) that 'these "insider" transactions ... 
involve questions of disclosure and questions of fairness that necessitate 
special rules.' 
The significance of this case lies in the support  it provides for the 
proposition that the interests of minority shareholders can be interpreted 
in diverse ways. Evidence was presented in the hearing before the 
Commission that the minority shareholders here had been offered a better 
price for their shares than they would have received in the market. Other 
evidence was given concerning the efficiency gains that would result for 
the corporation from a successful issuer bid. Despite this information, the 
OSC preferred a discourse of fairness for small shareholding, seeing the 
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interests of the minority as lying in remedying inequalities of information 
and access as between themselves and management (Law Society of 
Upper Canada, 1978: 21-22; Hutchinson, 1991: 197). This result illustrates 
the replacement of the predominant language of the Merger Report eight 
years previously with one explicitly rejected at that time. In sum, at the 
regulatory and political level, this period saw the mobilisation of dis- 
courses of both efficiency and fairness. While the regulators (both OSC 
and TSE) were ad idem in favouring the language of equality, political 
imperatives were moving in a different direction. 
FINAL MOVES 
The OSC's review was completed and Bill 7 was introduced to the 
House in February 1978. One of the most noteworthy changes from the 
previous draft was the return appearance of the private agreement exemp- 
tion, together with the proviso that if the price paid by the offeror exceeded 
the market price, an offer must be made to purchase all additional shares 
of the same class for a similar consideration (the so-called 'follow-up' 
offer). The effect of this provision was to eliminate the premium for 
controlling shareholders but not the opportunity to make a takeover by 
private agreement. The Chair of the Securities Commission characterised 
the private agreement provisions in Bill 7 as 'very clearly.., a compromise 
between two opposing points of view about how far we should go in this 
area' (LSUC, 1978:20). At the political level, the Minister for Consumer and 
Commercial Relations displayed rather more bluntness about the under- 
pinnings of this compromise when he stated 
Past versions of this Bill would simply have deleted the private agreement 
exemption, but it has become apparent that this approach would be unduly 
restrictive, would increase the administrative workload of the Commis- 
sion and would force businessmen to apply to the Commission for its 
approval of many transactions even though they would have no element 
of a control block premium. As a result, flexibility of trading would be 
decreased and costs of administration and compliance would be increased. 
(Ontario Securities Commission Bulletin, March, 1978:52) 
By identifying the problem to be solved as one of extraction of a 
premium for controlling shareholder advantage, the government was 
signalling that the general powers accruing to controlling shareholders, 
including that of facilitating a takeover without reference to the minority 
shareholders, were not on its reform agenda. Complete equality among 
shareholders, as represented by the elimination of the private agreement 
exemption, was eschewed in favour of considerations of flexibility for 
issuers and those in control of corporate enterprises. 
In the Standing Administration of Justice Committee deliberations of 
the House in April 1978, after the second reading of Bill 7, various groups 
had a last chance to influence the outcome of this prolonged attempt to 
legislate about private agreement takeovers. Two related arguments were 
mobilised by interest group participants in Committee d eb a t e - -  one to do 
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with fairness, the other to do with the legitimacy of the stock market itself. 
Appearing before the Committee, the OSC's position now seemed to be 
that a follow-up offer to minority shareholders, in a private agreement 
takeover at a premium price, was necessary to reinforce the 'credibility" of 
the market. There is some evidence that this argument was also used by 
the OSC to mobilise support  for the Bill from self-regulatory organisations 
like the TSE. For example, James Baillie, the Commission Chair, com- 
mented that:. 'I anticipate that perhaps the TSE and other organisations 
which feel that a provision like this is necessary to protect the credibility 
of the markets will be there [at the Administration of Justice Committee] 
to support  it' (LSUC, 1978: 274). In thus responding to evidence of 'the 
movement  of the public away from the equity markets,' the OSC forged 
a link between its interpretation of fairness for small shareholders and 
perceived economic consequences (LSUC, 1978: 23). Since no minority 
shareholders presented themselves to the Administration of Justice 
Committee, it appears that the Commission saw its own role as one of 
interpreting and representing the interests of these shareholders. The 
interpretation of their interests came to centre on the ability of small 
shareholders to rely on the integrity of the marketplace. The OSC's 
concern for this reliance contrasts with its previous focus on the economic 
value of entrepreneurial activity in the Merger Report. 
Both the TSE and the IDA indeed rallied to the OSC's call (Hancher 
and Moran, 1989: 274). The IDA contented itself with endorsing the stance 
taken in Bill 7 on the exemption, and adverting to the "considerable 
controversy' that had arisen in the past over the position of minority 
shareholders where a premium for control was paid. The TSE considered 
the 'compromise position' put forward in Bill 7 as the 'proper and benefi- 
cial solution' to the problem of private agreement takeovers. By ensuring 
that 'the public would have the opportunity to share in the premium paid 
to senior partners,' the compromise would assist in increasing the investor 
confidence which 'the Exchange has long believed constitutes a vital part 
of ensuring that the capital markets function properly and effectively." The 
TSE went on to make explicit the link between the discourse of market 
credibility and that of fairness. It understood investor confidence as 
depending on 'rules enforced against all, which are not only fair but are 
seen to be fair.' The language of fairness was thus mobilised to reinforce 
the legitimacy of the market. Similarly, 'the public investor must  not be 
concerned that the rules permit him to be disadvantaged by the insider or 
control group.'  What we see here is a subtle shift in the characteristics and 
identity of the minority shareholder from a potentially disenfranchised 
player.in a single corporate enterprise to one of a valuable participant in 
the marketplace generally. This further transformation of the interests of 
minority shareholders was again accomplished entirely by the construc- 
tions of other debate participants. 
Finally, that the language of fairness had achieved ascendancy in the 
debate is well illustrated by the arguments of a Joint Brief to the Admini- 
stration of Justice Committee submitted by seven major Canadian corpo- 
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rations. These were Algoma, Inco, MacMillan Bloedel, Motson, Noranda, 
SteelCo, and Trans Canada Pipelines. For convenience they will be here 
dubbed the Group of Seven. The terms in which this group's views were 
expressed bear out Baillie's characterisation of opposition to the Bill as 
'vociferous' (LSUC, 1978: 274). Their brief will be considered in some 
detail, since it is instructive in demonstrating both the importance of 
meaning in the mobilisation of open-textured legal concepts like fairness, 
and the possibility of using the same concepts, interpreted differently, to 
advance diverse interests. 
THE GROUP OF SEVEN: 
FAIRNESS IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER 
The brief began on a conciliatory note, with Bill 7 characterised as 'very 
close to being wholly acceptable, both in principle and in workability.' But 
hostility quickly escalated when private takeover agreements were con- 
sidereal. The follow-up offer should, according to the brief, be completely 
abandoned. The group went on to assert its 'fundamental and totally 
negative objection to intervention in private market transactions' to achieve 
a result different from that 'brought about by market forces.' However,  the 
fact that those market forces were allowed to operate through exemption 
from the normal legal requirements for takeovers was ignored. The Bill 7 
proposals were criticised as founded on the 'false assumption ... that 
holders of large blocks of shares are in an inherently preferred position 
relative to holders of small numbers of shares.' Since continued premiums 
would seem to provide evidence for this 'preferred position,' the Group of 
Seven resorted to the language of fairness to buttress their argument about 
the disadvantages suffered by large shareholders. 
It was argued that the follow-up offer was more likely to decrease 
rather than increase fairness. This was because large holdings had a 
number of disadvantages attached to them, to do with lack of liquidity and 
the greater risk involved in holding on to securities for long periods of 
time. The conclusion was therefore that 'there is no possible way of 
producing fairer results in a myriad of cases than the market place 
produces.' Here the brief must have been referring to the market place for 
control as opposed to the market place for shares, since it was clearly not 
payment  of the market price for shares for which the brief was arguing. 
The slippery nature of the Group of Seven's understanding of market 
price was exacerbated by its related argument that a follow-up offer would 
not actually help the minority shareholder. This was because, to avoid the 
risk of having to make a follow-up offer, purchasers would either decide 
not to do the deal or would offer a lower, risk-free price to the controller, 
giving the purchaser a better price than the 'true market price.' But not 
having the follow-up offer, of course, would mean that controlling share- 
holders would not get the 'true market price' either but  a premium above 
it. 
We have noted the group's avowed hostility to 'intervention in private 
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market  transactions' and the 'emasculation of the very basic right of 
ownership to sell what  one owns at a price that one wishes.' It is therefore 
a matter  of some iron y that another argument  mounted against the follow- 
up offer was that it ~vas redundant,  'given free and timely disclosure and 
stiff insider trading rules.' In other words, the existence of other forms of 
legal regulation was relied on to discredit the one in dispute. Similarly, it 
was contended that 'if a control block holder uses his control to oppress 
minori ty shareholders, they can take action to protect themselves. '  Since 
the action referred to here is presumably legal action, these propositions 
reveal some inconsistencies in the Group of Seven's faith in the market  
place as a corrective. It remained the group ' s  view that 'people do not 
require protection from normal, as opposed to artificial, incidents of the 
market , '  but  no clarification of the scope and meaning of these terms was 
provided.  
The group ' s  protestations were to no avail, since the follow-up offer 
section remained in the draft legislation, though the vote in favour was a 
narrow one (Courtright, 1985:73). The Bill was finally passed into law on 
June 23, 1978. However,  the point to note is that, although the idea of 
fairness was loose enough to be interpreted in a variety of ways, not all of 
those interpretations were equally compelling. The at tempt by  the Group 
of Seven to link the idea to the imperatives of an anonymous  market  place 
proved unconvincing in the face of alternative interpretations in terms of 
equality for minority shareholders. 
CONCLUSION 
Conclusions can be drawn from this example of regulatory reform at 
a number  of different levels. Looking first at the relationship of the interest 
groups  identified in the debate to the ultimate outcome, the first obvious 
thing to note is that, while controlling shareholders may  be considered a 
powerful  interest (especially given high levels of corporate concentration 
in the Canadian economy), the position they advanced was unsuccessful. 
Although the power  of those shareholders to undertake private agreement  
takeovers was retained, the follow-up offer, considered to be in the 
interests of weaker minority shareholders, was legislated despite the fact 
that no minori ty shareholders availed of any of the open fora where official 
decision-makers discussed the matter. Now, it could be said that it was the 
combined power  of the regulators - -  the OSC and TSE - -  in favour of the 
follow-up offer that explains its passage, but the point is that the outcome, 
especially in a climate of general government  concern for more efficient 
mergers,  was unpredictable rather than determined in advance. The 
OSC's position on the follow-up offer could hardly be considered an 
entrenched one, since it completely turned around mid-way through the 
decade. Similarly, it is at least arguable that the TSE'sinterest in the private 
agreement  exemption was relatively marginal, since this form of takeover 
was not taking place through the stock exchange. The TSE's position on 
private agreement  takeovers was therefore expressed through the lan- 
guage of general market  credibility. The main contribution of the TSE and 
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OSC, as we have seen, was rather to avail of various legal and economic 
discourses to formulate and reformulate the interests of minority share- 
holders.- 
It should also be pointed out that the very way the problem was 
defined - -  as one of balancing the interests of minority and controlling 
shareholders - -  was consequential for the configuration of interests in- 
volved in the outcome. There was relatively little attention to the interests 
of the target corporation as a whole, as distinct from its shareholders, in the 
issue of private agreement takeovers (Zeitlin, 1989). The offeror corpora- 
tion remained a shadowy entity also, merely making an appearance in a 
supporting role in the Group of Seven brief. Thus, close analysis of the 
debate as it progressed reveals that apparently dominant  and stable 
interest groups displayed rather more inconsistency and fragility than 
might have been supposed (Thompson, 1982). 
A pr imary aim of the paper  is to try to specify the range of connections 
between interests and legal discourse. Part of this involves showing that 
the respective power  of controlling shareholders on the one hand and the 
OSC and TSE (on behalf of small shareholders) on the other to achieve their 
desired outcome depended on the legal ideas and language they mobilised 
to establish their position. Obviously, the discourse of fairness, a s a  matter  
of regulatory doctrine, allows for multiple interpretations. Thus, while 
both sides used ideas of fairness to formulate their case, the version of it 
promoted by controlling shareholders (linked as it was to suppor t  for 
entrepreneurship and untrammelled market  forces) had become uncon- 
vincing and implausible because of the currency that had been achieved by 
the version linked to equality for minority shareholders. Part of the 
success of this interpretation was undoubtedly due to the link established 
with the discourse of market credibility. The general point is that interests 
can be both constrained and enabled by the discourses through which they 
operate. The interaction between interests and ideas, then, is a dynamic  
one in which the power of certain ideas can be sufficient to change the 
terrain on which decisions affecting interests must be made and on which 
those interests must  make their arguments. 
The empirical situation described here is characterised by  a complex 
set of relationships: between the corporation and different shareholder 
constituencies, among shareholders, and between shareholders and the 
market. All of these relationships are defined and reconstituted by  legal 
concepts. Thus another aspect of the interconnectedness of interests and 
legal discourse is the latter~s power to create or reinforce the existence of 
interests in the first place. For example, the availability of the statutory 
exemption was influential in concretising the opposition of the interests of 
controlling and minority shareholders and bringing to the surface the 
potentially adversarial relations between them. But not only did the 
exemption provide for the power  of controlling shareholders to extract 
p remiums  for their shares, it also gave a focus for identification of the 
powerlessness of small shareholders. The construction of minority share- 
holder interests in diverse ways during the debate is an interesting 
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example of how changes in interest positions track changes in discourse. 
Thus, a particular definition of corporate assets, to include control itself, 
could be significant in giving a legal basis to minority shareholders '  desire 
- -  as interpreted by the OSC and TSE - -  to share in the bounty  of the 
control premium.  Later, the language of market  credibility was used to 
reinterpret minority shareholders '  interests to mean trust in the integrity 
of the market  place. To reiterate the point made earlier, the power  of shifts 
in prevailing discourses and ideas to change how interests are identified 
illustrates the malleability of those interests. 
But ultimately, the possibility that alternative legal definitions of 
control could open the way to recognition of the fragmented and disunited 
nature of the corporate enterprise generally was too much of a nettle to 
grasp. The legislation of the follow-up offer can be understood as an effort 
designed to shore up the cracks created in the idea of a consensual, stable 
corporation by revelations of the divergent and inconsistent interests of 
different groups of shareholders. It also allowed more fundamental  
questions about the value of takeovers generally, to corporations, other 
corporate constituencies, and to the economy, to remain unaddressed.  
Finally, despite the Group of Seven's invocation of ' regulation'  and 
'private ownership '  as rigidly separable categories, it should be clear by  
now that the relationship between law and regulation on the one hand and 
the corporation and market  on the other is a much more interwoven and 
mutual ly  dependent  one. Legal definitions and categories enforce particu- 
lar versions of the corporate form, its assets and organisation, which are 
consequently malleable and contingent. The existence of the legislative 
exemption for private agreement takeovers created the 'market  for con- 
trol' from which controlling shareholders benefited and whose bargaining 
advantages  they were reluctant to surrender. The TSE looked to the 
regulation of private agreement takeovers as a way of producing the 
investor confidence necessary for the market  to continue to operate 
(Sunstein, 1990). It is clear that the language of fairness was also important  
for this purpose. Thus, one of the main accomplishments of a provisional 
and indeterminate regulatory process is not to constrain or erect 'artificial" 
barriers to economic activity, but is rather the continuous constitution of 
the marke t  itself. 
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ENDNOTES 
l Examples of disclosures include those to be made when issuing a prospectus pursuant  
to the initial public sale of securities or at a time of a 'material change" in corporate 
affairs. 
2 The Report's full title was Report of the Committee of the OSC on the Problems of Disclosure 
Raised for lnvestors by Business Combinations and Private Placements. One month prior to 
the establishment of the OSC's internal committee, the US SEC'sWheat report was 
published which made recommendations on the same issues as were preoccupying 
the Merger Study. 
These were Salter and Bray, Director and Vice-Chair of the OSC respectively, the latter 
of whom was largely responsible for writing the Merger Report. 
Speech by the federal Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce ( the Hon. Don 
Jamieson) to the Third Canadian Financial Conference in June, 1976. The Minister 's 
speech discussed the government 's role in creating a "climate ... which will allow 
companies to make profits,' especially by 'readjust[ing] our emphasis on incentives 
that have largely gone to big business." 
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